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ON THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND
REGULATION
Hans-W. Micklitz*
INTRODUCTION
Are we private lawyers not convinced that we share a common
understanding of “freedom of contract,” of “freedom”1 and
“contract,” and of restrictions on that freedom of contract through
“regulation?”2 Is this common understanding not the basis on which
we all operate implicitly or explicitly in our intellectual discourse
cutting across different legal traditions and different legal cultures?3 At
the very least, is not the notion of contract freedom shared in all
countries governed by a market society and even more so if the market
society is embedded into the Westernized model of democracy?4
What if this common assumption turns out to be wrong or is
no more than a rather superficial “gentleman’s agreement,” which
allows us to communicate with each other whilst maintaining our own
preconceptions? Digging deeper into intellectual history, legal theory,
and legal philosophy reveals that, for example, a French lawyer and an
*

Professor, European University Institute Florence.
See generally UDO DI FABIO, DIE KULTUR DER FREIHEIT (2005) (for a
German understanding of freedom of contract).
2
See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999); Gary Marks,
Liesbet Hooghe & Kermit Blank, European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v.
Multi-level Governance, 34 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 3341 (1996).
3
See Kaarlo Tuori, Regulation Theories, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW:
RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL THINKING 11-57 (Miguel Maduro,
Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2014); THE MANY CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE
(Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2010).
4
Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law,
9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 399 (2000).
1
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English common lawyer may not necessarily be talking about the same
thing when they argue about “freedom of contract.” This becomes
even more complicated if we look at the limitations and restrictions on
“freedom of contract,” which are set out via statutory regulation.5
These lawyers might agree on what a state is by equating it with the
“nation state,” but might encounter more problems in understanding
and agreeing on the meaning of “regulation.” Regulation can be private
or public. When created statutorily, regulation might facilitate or
restrict freedom of contract. Statutory intervention, might, depending
on one’s perspective (liberal or welfarist), trigger very different
expectations, feelings, or sentiments. Our perception of “regulation”
very much depends on what we expect as citizens from “our” state.
This paper starts with two examples that are meant to highlight
deeper cultural differences in deciding conflicting contractual issues.
One example is taken from the French/German context, the other
example is from the German/American context. These examples serve
to underpin the hypothesis that the understanding of contract and
regulation in the three countries under investigation – France,
Germany and the United Kingdom – differs considerably and the
reasons for the differences can be found in the intellectual history of
the respective states. Further, this paper continues by contrasting the
three different models of freedom of contract and regulation with the
emerging European model. The hypothesis is that the European
Union is yielding its own model which differs from the Member States
model. This is not only due to the particular legal nature of the
European Union as a quasi-state, but also to the changing economic
and political environment after World War II. The conclusions remain
tentative. The reader is invited to stand back and carefully look at the
ongoing transformations of contract and regulation. Intellectual
history and comparative research are the appropriate tools for such an
exercise.

ROLF KNIEPER, ZWANG, VERNUNFT, FREIHEIT: STUDIEN ZUR
JURISTISCHEN KONSTRUKTION DER GESELLSCHAFT (1981).
5
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ENGLISH-FRENCH DEFECTIVE SWIMMING POOLS

A well-known pair of cases6 were decided before English and
French courts facing a nearly identical problem.7 In Ruxley, a
homeowner mandated a construction company to build a swimming
pool in his garden.8 The water depth did not comply with what was
agreed upon in the contract by twenty-two centimeters. The
homeowner asked the construction company to rebuild the swimming
pool. The House of Lords did not grant the homeowner specific
performance.9 The House of Lords found that the swimming pool was
usable, although not in the envisaged way; therefore, pecuniary
damages sufficed to compensate the homeowner. Implicit in the
House of Lords decision is the idea that it does not make sense to
destroy a usable swimming pool just to satisfy the original contract.
This combination of pragmatic and utilitarian considerations will be
explained as the “English model.”
Similarly, in France, a home was built thirty-three centimeters
lower than what was agreed upon in the contract. In contrast to the
House of Lords in Ruxley, however, the French Cour de Cassation held
that the construction company must rebuild the house because it did
not deliver exactly what was agreed to between the parties. Moreover,
the construction company had to bear the full cost of reconstruction,
and pecuniary damages did not suffice to compensate the homeowner
for the broken promise.10 The “reason” behind the agreement
prevailed over any other considerations one might have invoked. This
“French model” will later be examined under this rationale.

Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. v Forsyth, [1996] A.C. 344
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] 3e civ., May 11, 2005, Bull. civ. III, no. 103 (Fr.).
7
I have taken this example from Ruth Sefton-Green. Ruth Sefton-Green,
The European Union, Law and Society: Making the Societal-Cultural Difference, in PRIVATE
LAW AND THE MANY CULTURES OF EUROPE 37, 52 (Thomas Wilhelmsson et al. eds.,
2007).
8
Id. at 52.
9
Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd., [1996] A.C. 344.
10
Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ.,
May 11, 2005, Bull. civ. III, no. 103 (Fr.).
6
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Comparative lawyers who study these and other similar cases
are aware of the differences between English common law and the
French Civil Code.11 However, the fact that a layperson, had they to
decide the case, would come to the same result tells us something
about our legal consciousness, and the deeper assumptions we share
about our own legal systems based on the expectations we have in the
functioning of the courts and of society, for good and for bad. The
Eurobarometer is a neat indicator that allows for a deeper look into
these differing preconceptions at least between the twenty-eight E.U.
Member States.12 We may speculate on what courts in the United
States, Canada, Brazil, Israel, Italy, or Germany would have decided in
a case similar to the English or French cases. I am sure there are similar,
if not identical, cases, and I assume that a survey of the citizens of these
countries would lead to results similar to my English-French
comparison.13 If my assumption is correct, there must be a deeper layer
of rationales enshrined in long-grown cultures and traditions behind
the legal rules.14
II.

GERMAN TOURISTS STRANDED IN FLORIDA

My second example deals with consumer law, which restricts
and limits freedom of contract via statutory intervention. In the early
Ruxley and the French example are not unique. They represent a wellestablished and long standing doctrine. See id.; see also Franz Werro, Comparative Studies
in Private Law: A European Point of View, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION ON
COMPARATIVE LAW 132-33 (Mauro Busani & Hugo Mattei eds., 2012).
12
Since 1973, the European Commission has been monitoring the
evolution of public opinion in the Member States, thus helping the preparation of
texts, decision-making and the evaluation of its work. The surveys and studies
address major topics concerning European citizenship: enlargement, social situation,
health, culture, information technology, environment, the Euro, defence, etc. See, e.g.,
European
Commission,
Public
Opinion,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
13
For example, the Trento Common Core Project is based on the idea
that the same case is looked at through the eyes of different legal orders. THE
COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, http://www.common-core.org/
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
14
At this point in my paper, I do not argue that these rationales are
“eternal” in the sense of Pierre Legrand’s argument that European legal cultures are
not converging. See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996).
11
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1990s, German tourists used a tour operator to book all-inclusive trips,
which included transportation, accommodations, and meals, to Florida
at a favorable price. The trip operator went bankrupt, and the German
tourists found themselves stranded in Florida. The tourists were forced
to buy tickets at their own cost to return to Germany.15
The German tourists sued the German state under the
Francovich doctrine.16 The tourists sought restitution or compensation
of the costs for their return tickets.17 At the time of litigation, Germany
had not implemented Directive 90/314/EEC on package tours.18 This
Directive obliges Member States to shield consumers from the
bankruptcy of tour operators and shifts the risk of default from the
individual traveler to the community of travelers. The risk is thereby
socialized, as all potential travelers must cover the costs for a fund the
tour operator provides.19 The German state lost and its liability was
later confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
in Dillenkofer.20 This was a costly lesson for the German state which
had to pay roughly 20 million German Marks (10 million Euros).
Consumer organizations and consumer victims celebrated the
judgment as a great success.
The societal dimension of the conflict underlying the case is of
particular interest here. At the time of the intense debate on who
should bear the costs of the stranded tourists, a German television
For the facts and the subsequent decision of the CJEU, see Joined
Cases C-178, 179/94 & C-188-90/94, Dillenkofer v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845.
16
Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. I5395. The Francovich doctrine creates non-contractual liability of Member States for
violations of EU law: “a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to
individuals as a result of breaches of [European Union] law for which the State can
be held responsible.” Id. ¶ 35.
17
Dillenkofer, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845.
18
Council Directive 90/314 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 June 1990 on Package Travel, Package Holidays, and Package Tours,
1990 O.J. (L 15) (EC).
19
Id. at art. 7; see STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND
POLICY 98-101 (2005); Klause Tonner, Kommentierung des Kapitel 13: Reisevertrag, in
ZIVILRECHT UNTER EUROPÄISCHEM EINFLUSS: DIE RICHTLINIENKONFORME
AUSLEGUNG DES BGB UND ANDERER GESETZE – ERLÄUTERUNGEN DER
WICHTIGSTEN EG-VERORDNUNGEN (Herausgeber Gebauer & Thomas Wiedmann
eds., 2010).
20
Dillenkofer, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845.
15
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program invited several of the stranded tourists and an American
lawyer to discuss the proper remedy in the case. When given the
opportunity to tell their stories, the German tourists said that, since a
single return ticket cost three to four times more than the package tour,
they went to the German embassy asking for financial support. At
some point during the television program, the American lawyer asked
the stranded tourists and the listeners a simple question: why not
charter a plane? The lawyer suggested that chartering a plane would
have been much less expensive for both the stranded tourists and for
Germany.
The lawyer’s question brings to light the expectations of
German citizens, particularly the economically suspect deal of two
weeks holidays in Florida for 500 to 600 German Marks. The tourists
trusted the contract adage that a deal is a deal. Maybe the tourists
subconsciously were also convinced that the German state would bail
them out if their contractual expectations turned out to be wrong.
Would consumers of a state other than Germany have had the same
expectations of their contract with a package tour operator and of their
state? Similarly, would these consumers have bombarded their
embassies with complaints, or would they have chartered a plane? I
assume that the expectations differ considerably.
However, there is more at stake than the help provided by
national embassies for stranded citizens. As a result of the Francovich
doctrine, E.U. law equips all E.U. citizens with individually enforceable
rights to force their state to pay for the transfer, provided the
respective state has not implemented, or has not correctly
implemented, the Directive on package tours. How is this possible? It
is not that the Member States accept liability voluntarily. Instead, it is
the European Union which imposes such liability on Member States
via the CJEU. Thus, the regulation of package tours by the European
Union not only sets boundaries for the freedom of package tour
operators, who are forced to abide by the E.U. rules when exercising
their economic activity, but also paves the way for more
entrepreneurial freedom in a European market.

6
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THE CONDITIONS FOR A JOURNEY INTO INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY

This paper will now discuss the rationales behind the notion of
freedom of contract by examining the German, French, U.K., and E.U.
legal systems, all of which I am familiar with from extensive training
and practice.21 I want to ground this discussion in my experiences with
A word is needed on my knowledge of foreign legal systems, especially
since current comparative legal methodology is in a state of crisis. When I was
educated in comparative legal research in the 1970s and 1980s, the thinking in
Europe followed the ground-breaking work of Zweigert and Kötz. See generally
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(Tony Weier trans., 3d ed. 1998); TONY WEIR ON THE CASE (Catherine Barnard et
al. eds., 2012) . Legal systems were grouped around “legal families”—namely the four
European families, the Romanic, the Germanic, the common law, and the Nordic
countries—all of which share a common European culture, i.e., Roman law and
Christian canon law. See Franz Wieacker & Edgar Bodenheimer, Foundations of
European Legal Culture, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1990); FRANZ WIEACKER,
VORAUSSETZUNGEN EUROPÄISCHER RECHTSKULTUR VERLAG GÖTTINGER
TAGEBLATT (1985). The method applied was a functional comparison by looking for
the “best solution,” or the solution that best fit the differing traditions of the states.
What is more important here was the pedagogical message inherent to the idea of
legal families. Engaging in comparative law and comparative legal method requires
not only knowledge of the language, but also knowledge of the country and the
cultural foundations of the respective societies. This kind of knowledge, however,
must be gained through training and education in the country itself. In that spirit, I
benefited from the opportunity to study law in Switzerland (the French speaking
part), France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. Today, such a
rigorous training requirement seems old-fashioned, as comparative lawyers have to
engage in the comparison of countries and legal systems even if they know neither
the language nor have fully experienced the country’s culture. The E.U. promoted
this type of approach through its insistence on “inclusion,” which does not follow
the traditional division of legal families, but converges the legal orders of twentyeight Member States. This approach leads to a comparison of legal systems via
simplistic methods, such as tables and charts. I admit that I have been involved in
this more modern approach. Interestingly enough, legal origin theory (LOT) took
the legal families approach seriously, which could have reinvigorated the approach
of Zweigert and Kötz. See generally LEGAL ORIGIN THEORY (Simon Deakin &
Katharina Pistor eds., 2012) (analyzing the different strains of legal origin theory.
However, what actually happened was that LOT revealed the weakness of thinking
in families, as it cannot do justice to the deeper traditions and cultures of the
countries compared. Professor Ralf Michaels labelled LOT “comparison in
numbers,” and questioned why comparative lawyers remained so speechless in their
reaction and did not defend the functional method. Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law
21
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the countries’ culture and history. Building on previous research on
social justice in private law22 and the (un)systematics of European legal
culture,23 I seek to identify the dominating Rechtsbewußtsein, i.e., legal
conscience,24 with respect to intellectual history, legal theory, and legal
philosophy. Then, I want to transpose the intellectual history to my
question on the cultural and societal foundations of freedom of
contract. I am fully aware that modelling by country is risky and that it
might look as if traditions and cultures are not subject to political,
economic, and social change.25 I would defend, nevertheless, that such
grouping around models is useful in identifying differences and maybe
in deepening the mutual understanding of our conceptions of freedom
of contract and the regulation thereof.

by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional
Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765 (2009); see also Mathias M. Siems,
Comparative
Law
(Oct.
21,
2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2512938.
22
See THE MANY CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW (Hans-W. Micklitz ed., 2011).
23
Hans-W. Micklitz, The (Un)-Systematics of (Private) Law as an Element of
European Legal Culture, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE 81-115
(Geneviève Helleringer & Kai Purnhagen eds., 2014).
24
See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 18502000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); The Rule of Law, Political Choices and Developing Common Sense,
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 95 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro
Santos eds., 2006); MENTALITÄTEN-GESCHICHTE: ZUR HISTORISCHEN
REKONSTRUKTION GEISTIGER PROZESSE (André Burguière & Ulrich Raulff eds.,
1987); Hagen Schulze, Mentalitätsgeschichte – Chancen und Risiken eines Paradigmas der
französischen Geschichtswissenschaft, 36 GESCHICHTE IN WISSENSCHAFT UND
UNTERRICHT 247 (1985). See also Sebastian Conard & Shalini Randeria, Geteilte
Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt, in JENSEITS DES EUROZENTRISMUS:
POSTKOLONIALE
PERSPEKTIVEN
IN
DEN
GESCHICHTS-UND
KULTURWISSENSCHAFTEN 9-49 (Sebastian Conard & Shalini Randeria eds., 2002).
25
See WOLFGANG STREECK, RE-FORMING CAPITALISM: INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 251 (2009) (strongly critiquing that
the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ neglects the two major driving forces of change in
capitalist societies: the fear of workers and the greed of entrepreneurs); Dorothee
Bohle & Béla Greskovits, Varieties of Capitalism and Capitalism << tout court >>, 50
EUR. J. SOCIETY 355 (2009); Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties
of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001)(a stock
taking of the debate).
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WHERE TO START WITH THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY?

The analysis of the notion of freedom contract should begin
with the Roman law. We can refer to the history of Roman law, and
how its foundations have survived the last 2,000 years in both
continental and common law countries;26 however, the historical
ground might be less stable and less safe than its promoters pretend.27
Regulation is much more complicated. The Roman Empire used what
today we call “regulation” to govern the economy. “Regulations,”
whether back then or now, have almost always been associated with
the existence of a state and a territory. This brings us to the Peace of
Westphalia, concluded in 1648, which laid the foundations for what
later became the nation state.
The benchmark for the beginning or the reinvigoration of
Roman law is the foundation of the University of Bologna around
1130/1140 and the scholastic school of law. According to Harold
Berman, the conflict between Pope Gregory VII and Henry IV, Holy
Roman Emperor, a century earlier over the independence of the
Church from the temporal power heralded and triggered the reestablishment of Roman law, private law, and contract law.28 Berman
argues that the separation of spiritual and temporal power not only
initiated early state building and paved the way for the development of
the nation state after the religious wars of the sixteenth and
seventeenth century, but also led to the creation of the scholastic
school of law first in Bologna and then elsewhere in Europe.29 The
Crusades between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries led to a
stronger intellectual exchange between the West and the East through
the reinvigoration of Greek and Roman philosophy, as well as through

See Reinhard Zimmermann, “Heard Melodies are Sweet, but Those Unheard
are Sweeter . . .” Condicio tacita, Implied Conditions und die Fortbildung des europäischen
Vertragsrechts, 193 ARCHIV FÜR CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 121 (1993).
27
Thomas Duve, Von der Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte zu einer Rechtsgeschichte
Europas in globalhistorischer Perspektive, 20 J. FOR MAX PLANCK INST. FOR EUR. LEGAL
HIST. 16 (2012) (a more nuanced analysis of the transfer and re-transfer of laws
between European countries and what later became their colonies).
28
See generally, HAROLD J. BERMAN, RECHT UND REVOLUTION: DIE
BILDUNG DER WESTLICHEN RECHTSTRADITION (2001).
29
Id. at 146, 215.
26
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commercial exchange.30 Hence, there is a connection between the
rediscovery of Roman law, the split of spiritual and temporal power,
and the Crusades, which renders the intellectual history of Western law
to that époque indispensable.
One might alternatively argue that the starting point of my
undertaking could and should be the discovery of the Americas in the
fifteenth century and the conflict between the Spanish and English
empires, without which the deeper intellectual history of the United
States cannot be fully understood. New research initiated by Thomas
Duve, the Director of the Max-Planck-Institut at Frankfurt am Main,
emphasizes the cultural, political, and economic interaction and
interchange between Europe and the “New World,” or the two
Americas.31 My approach is more modest and is more closely tied to
my European cultural roots, the younger history of codified
continental law, and the established role of the state in the economy
and society.
This paper owes its origins to an invitation to speak on social
justice in private law at the Cour de Cassation in Paris.32 Thinking
about justice in the French academic and judicial environment must
coincide–at least this is what I am convinced of–with an analysis of the
connection between state-building and constitution-building, as well as
private legal order building and codification in the aftermath of the
French revolution 1789. Whilst such a starting point offers joint
perspectives in comparing France and Germany, it falls short by not
taking the United Kingdom into account. If anything, a parallel may be
drawn between the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century
and German state-building of the nineteenth century on the one hand,
and the Civil War and the conflict between the English Crown and
Oliver Cromwell in the seventeenth century on the other. This period,
i.e. the seventeenth throughout the nineteenth century, is roughly the
period I investigated in attempting to explain where the different
patterns of freedom of social justice derive from. I use these findings

See id.
See Duve, supra note 27.
32
Hans-W. Micklitz, Speech at the Cour de Cassation Paris: From Social
Justice to Participatory Justice (2007).
30
31
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in my attempt to transfer them an understanding of the deeper layers
of freedom of contract.
V.

MODELING THE MANY FACES OF “FREEDOM OF CONTRACT”

Table 1 illustrates my understanding of freedom of contract and
regulation, rooted in intellectual history. This section will first explain the
categorization of England, France, Germany, and the European
Union.33 I will then provide a rough account of the socio-economic
and political background to the different models of autonomy and
regulation in those three countries and the European Union, thereby
elaborating on the characteristics of the many faces of freedom of
contract in a bottom-up perspective.

The following analysis is a developed and adjusted version of Hans-W.
Micklitz, supra note 23.
33
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Table 1: Understandings of Freedom of Contract, Regulation
and Their Intellectual History (France, Germany, United Kingdom
European Union)
Country
France

Germany

United
Kingdom

European
Union

Model of
freedom of
contract
A political
project
Code Civil

Intellectual
history

Regulation

French
rationalism
Enlightenment

A liberal
authoritarian/
paternalistic
project
Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch
A liberal
pragmatic
project
Common law

German idealism
Metaphysics

Regulating
contracts as a
political
counterproject
Regulating
contracts as a
technical
bureaucratic
exercise

A technocratic
project
Regulatory
private law

Instrumentalism
and
functionalism

Empiricism and
Utilitarianism
Pragmatism

12

Regulating
contracts to
solve
‘concrete
Problems’
Regulated
freedom –
enabling and
shaping
autonomy
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The English Model: Liberal and Pragmatic

In English history there is no comparable event to the
adoption of the Civil Code in France or in Germany. The civil war that
took place in the seventeenth century in England led to major changes
in society and the parliamentarian system. However, the English Civil
War neither yielded a constitution nor a coherent codified body of civil
law; rather, it only made way for the Declaration of the Bill of Rights
in 1689. The French and the German legal systems, as seen through
the eyes of a common law lawyer (daring to suggest that this is possible
for me, a civil law lawyer), share a relatively homogenous view on the
role and function of freedom of contract in society. These legal
systems are united in the idea of universal values that infiltrate legal
principles and concepts. “Autonomy” or “autonomie” is at the core of
these values, and this is exactly where common lawyers run into
difficulties.34
The true difference between continental law and common law
dates further back than the French revolution, and it was crucial to
identify the point at which the continental and common law systems
diverged. I considered the clash between different philosophies, and
to the remaining influence of the scholastic in continental Europe and
its growing critique through nominalism in the United Kingdom. I also
considered that the divergence occurred during medieval times when
the relative cultural unity of Europe broke into pieces.35 Therefore, I
think empiricism is responsible for the deep differences between
continental and common law legal systems. Despite the strong
intellectual exchange, especially between France and England, Hobbes
imported ideas from France, Rousseau referred to John Locke, and the
ideas and concepts of Francis Bacon’s empiricism became prevalent
after the failure of Cromwell. Empiricism paved the way for
utilitarianism–and here we have not only the key to understanding
English reservations against regulatory intervention into the economy,

34

See Lord R. Goff, The Future of the Common Law, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.

745 (1997).
35

BERMAN, supra note 28, at 265.
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but also the explanation for English pragmatism,36 which allows for
regulatory intervention when there is a concrete need for action.
Both historical strings, which are tied together in my discussion
above, justify the assumption that the continental European
understanding of freedom of contract does not comply with
philosophical, historical, economic, and legal structures in England. In
other words, England has paved the way for a legal system which is
deeply rooted in nominalistic and utilitarian thinking. Freedom of
contract lies at the crossroads of these deep roots in English
intellectual history. Nominalism served to cut away the ideological
barriers enshrined in the scholastic school of law and to free English
contract law from the Pandectist heritage; utilitarianism went hand in
hand with the rise of the English “trading state” (Handelsstaat), which
has its origins in the nineteenth century.37 The heart of English
contract law lies in the freedom of commerce and the freedom to
conclude contracts. Freedom of contract, therefore, means first and
foremost the economic freedom to voluntarily engage in economic
transactions without any risk of statutory interferences, with the
exception of paying taxes to the Crown.38
Compared to German Idealism (Kant, Fichte, Hegel,
Schelling) and French Rationalism (Descartes, Pascal, Voltaire,
Rousseau), the English view of the role and function of contract law is
much more economic in its basic assumptions. It is a much smaller
argumentative step from utility to economic efficiency and economic
effectiveness, compared with duty, reason, will, or spirit (Pflicht,
Vernunft, Wille, Verstand, Geist). English contract law can be much
more easily adapted to European “integration through law,”39 where
See Goff, supra note 34; Basil Markesinis, Learning from Europe and
Learning in Europe, in THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS, FOREIGN
INFLUENCES, AND ENGLISH LAW ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY (Basil
Markesinis ed., 1994); Thijmen Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads
of Legal Traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (1991).
37
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1909).
38
LAWRENCE JAMES, THE RISE AND THE FALL OF BRITISH EMPIRE (1st
ed. 1994).
39
See “INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW” REVISITED: THE MAKING OF THE
EUROPEAN POLITY (Daniel Augenstein ed., 2012); Integration Through Law: Europe and
the American Federal Experience, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 3-68 (Mauro
Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe & Joseph Weiler eds., 1986).
36
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the judicial system is given a major role in the realization of the Internal
Market.40
What is the relationship between the particular English variant
of freedom of contract and English legal culture? The English state is
a liberal state. Its function is not to control economic behavior but to
guarantee freedom of contract. In the seventeenth century this
concerned the merchant adventurer, today it concerns the business
environment at large.41 Statutory intervention in the economy is
feasible if there is a political need. Labor law and consumer law
legislation illustrate this approach. The U.K. Parliament was at the
forefront of consumer legislation. With regard to consumer credit and
consumer safety, the U.K. Parliament has long set the benchmark for
statutory intervention. Pragmatism is the guiding idea of statutory
regulation restricting the freedom to contract.
This approach can be felt in the way in which the transposition
of European consumer law directives are integrated into the English
system. Directive 99/44/EC42 is an example. The U.K. Parliament
rejected any attempt to revise the English law on contracts. Such an
attempt would have challenged the foundations of freedom of contract
by creating a separate legislation to stand side-by-side with the
common law on contracts on the one hand, and the Sale of Goods Act

40
No research has been undertaken as to whether there is a link between
the adherence of the United Kingdom to the Europe Union and the deepening of
European integration via case law. Whilst the building blocks van Gend en Loos and
Costa Enel were decided before the UK joined the EU, the ground-breaking
judgments of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon paved the way for the development of the
Internal Market and were made with the participation of UK judges. Today’s pattern
of integration might have changed. Christian Joerges, What is left of the integration
through law project? A reconstruction in conflicts-law perspectives, in THE EUROPEAN RESCUE
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION? 37-67 (Edoardo Chiti, Augustín José Menéndez, Pedro
Gustavo Teixeira eds. 2012) (speaks of “integration without law,” referring to the
dominance of politics and the influential role of governance.)
41
PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
(1985); DAVID J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS (1999) (showing that the real turning point was between 1790 and
1830, when the last remnants of just price were stripped away).
42
Council Directive 99/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer
goods and associates guarantees, 1999 O.J. (L 171) (EC).
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on the other.43 Under E.U. Directive 93/13/EEC, a similar continuity
can be demonstrated in the recent decisions of the House of Lords on
the control of unfair contract terms in consumer contracts.44 This piece
of E.U. law has led to irritation in the English system, as it submits
standard terms to a general fairness test, an approach which runs
counter to the ideology of the English Parliament,45 where regulatory
intervention is not meant to challenge the significance of freedom of
contract in general but to solve concrete problems.46
In conclusion, the basic formula which lies at the heart of
English legal culture can be condensed into one single formula–what
is useful is right. Here nominalism, empiricism and utilitarianism come
together. Freedom of contract is foundational to the common law on
contracts, and statutory intervention is acceptable as long as it aims at
solving concrete consumer or labor concerns.
B.

The French Model: Rational and Political

France has a particular historical role in the legal and
theoretical discourse on the interrelationship between constitutionbuilding and the making of private legal order. The results of the
French revolution are still shaping our understanding of constitutions,
civil codes, “contract,” and “tort” today. In only twenty years the key
events in France which would define these notions occurred. In
contrast, in the United Kingdom similar notions developed from an
evolutionary process, where no clear-cut moment of constitution
building and private legal order making can be fixed. The French
Revolution led to a break with feudalistic structures47 and instituted a
See LUCINDA MILLER, THE EMERGENCE OF EU CONTRACT LAW –
EXPLORING EUROPEANIZATION (2011) (analyzing the struggle in the UK over the
implementation of Directive 99/44).
44
Council Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer
contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC).
45
See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergencies, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
46
See Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey Nat’l plc & Others, [2009] UKSC
6, [2010] 1 A.C. 696 (appeal taken from Eng. and Wales); General of Fair Trading v.
First Nat’l Bank plc, [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] A.C. 481 (appeal taken from Eng. and
Wales); Hein Kötz, Schranken der Inhaltskontrolle bei den Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen
der Banken: Entscheidung des britischen Supreme Court, 25 ZEuP 332 (2012).
47
See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963).
43
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bourgeois society governed by individual freedom and equality of
rights, which became even more visible in the Code Civil and in the
French Constitution.48 The Revolution’s legacy can easily be found in
the German Civil Code, which was adopted a century later.
To portray the French understanding of freedom of contract
and regulation, I start from two premises. First, the vision of the
French revolution, which was proclaimed in the Declaration of Human
Rights, pinned down in a Constitution, and later codified in the Civil
Code, has deeper social, cultural, economic, and intellectual roots. I
argue that today’s conception of freedom of contract in France can
best be understood as a political forward-looking concept, which can
be traced back to French Rationalism49 and Descartes.50
Secondly, French society may be characterized by the tension
between intellectual projects guided by “les grandes idées,”–the French
Constitution and the French Code–which strengthen the power of the
Executive to the detriment of the Judiciary, and the highly politicized
bottom-up resistance against an excessively far-reaching executive
power.51 The fight over “the Social”52—the regulatory intervention to
protect workers in employment contracts and later the consumers in
business to consumer (B2C) contracts—has demonstrated that setting
limits to freedom of contract through statutory intervention is a highly
politicized matter that is subject to potential conflicts.
Just as in England, the intellectual turning point in France can
be attributed to the fading influence of scholastic thinking. Academic
48

See FRANZ WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT 343

(1967).
For a deeper analysis, see LAURENCE BONJOUR, IN DEFENSE OF PURE
REASON (1998); Laurence BonJour, A Rationalist Manifesto, 18 CANADIAN J. OF PHIL.
SUPPLEMENTARY 53 (1992).
50
See EGON FRIEDELL, KULTURGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT: DIE KRISE
DER EUROPÄISCHEN SEELE VON DER SCHWARZEN PEST BIS ZUM ERSTEN
WELTKRIEG (2007) (discussing Descartes and his methodological thinking).
51
This is my own interpretation of the French development.
52
See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 19, 95 (discussing the rise of “The Social”
and its intellectual origins); from a German perspective, but taking the French impact
into account, in particular Duguit, Salleilles and Gény, see Wieacker, supra note 48, at
543 § 28 (“Der Zerfall der inneren Einheit des Privatrechts und das Sozialrecht”.) In
that vain, law has a particular social function to fulfill.
49
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questioning of the spirit evolved from the methodological constraints
of scholasticism and paved the way for a new rational method in
philosophy. French philosopher Michel Eyguem de Montaigne (15331592) set long-lasting incentives for critical reflection of all existing
knowledge and values, which later came to be known as
“Enlightenment.”53 This new method to investigate the “truth” and
the concept of the truth was left in the seventeenth century to
Descartes, who began with his Discours de la Méthode.54 Descartes
claimed that a particular method to acquire the truth was needed to
solve all philosophical questions. Unlike utilitarianism, Descartes
believed that what is true is useful. Without Descartes’s theory, it is
difficult to understand the political conception of the French Civil
Code. Descartes’ philosophy results in the priority of theory over
practice, which is the basic thesis of French intellectualism.
Based on this premise, the link between the French political
project of freedom of contract and the particularities of the French
legal culture become clear. Freedom of contract is first and foremost
tied to the key function of the “reason,” “raison,” or “Vernunft” in the
French civil law system. The idea is that freedom of contract is more
than just an exercise to maximize mutual economic benefit. More is at
stake in the communication between the parties, namely, the
commitment to a contract is the product of a reasonable decision.
Autonomie de la volonté is bound in the belief or assumption (“Einsicht”)
in a higher reason that is deeper than the individual transaction.55 This
is the Cartesian side of the concept of autonomie de la volonté. However,
there is also the Rousseauean side, and it is here where the political
dimension of the concept of automomie de la volonté is more obvious.
Autonomie de la volonté may not be equated with individual freedom in
the meaning of German idealism, which is inward looking. To the
contrary, it is outward looking toward society itself and to the
embedding of reason into the political environment. This is what
Rousseau called the volonté générale (general will). Without Rousseau’s
concept of democracy and the conviction that the people will consent
See FRIEDELL, supra note 50.
RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE POUR BIEN CONDUIRE
SA RAISON, ET CHERCHER LA VÉRITÉ DANS LES SCIENCES (1637).
55
This implies the need to look for a certain substantive equivalence in
the mutual contractual relations, in German “das materielle Äquivalenzprinzip der
vernunftsrechtlichen Vertragslehre.”
53
54
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to the volonté générale, it is not possible to understand the political
dimension of the concept of autonomy in the French civil code.56
In France, there is also a peculiar understanding of the role and
function of regulatory intervention in the economy to protect workers
and consumers and, more in general, to restrict freedom of contract in
commercial transactions through statutory regulation. Since
mercantilist times, the French government played a strong role in the
organization and creation of the economy.57 The economy must follow
political prerogatives in order to address social concerns and any other
political requirements. What matters for our discussion is the strong
connection between the role and function of the political, and the
understanding of regulatory intervention. The political dimension
must not necessarily materialize in a top-down fashion, i.e. through
legislative acts on what nowadays is called social regulation or
executive intervention into the management of the economy of the
country. The political may also emerge bottom-up, through resistance
on the streets against the supremacy of the state managed economy
over politics.
To demonstrate the continuity of the French legal conscience
(Rechtsbewußtsein) and of the breadth and depth of the political in social
regulation, I will again start with reference to the implementation of
E.U. Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sales. Under strong pressure
from civil lawyers and civil law doctrine, the French legislature decided
that, rather than integrate the rules on consumer protection into the
Civil Code, it would place the respective articles in the Code de la
Consommation.58 This strategy preserved the integrity of the Civil Code
as an “eternal” political project, which might be regarded as an integral
part of the French identity.59 However, there is one notable difference
56

I am fully aware that Rousseau differs from Descartes in his image of

the person.
57
See KARL PRIBRAM, GESCHICHTE DES ÖKONOMISCHEN DENKENS, [A
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC REASONING] 194 (Erster Band ed., Horst Brühmann trans.,
1998); COLIN HEYWOOD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRENCH ECONOMY 17501914 (1995).
58
See MILLER, supra note 43 (reconstructing the political fights over the
correct way to implement Directive 99/44 in the French legal system).
59
French scholars had a strong reaction against the idea of a European
Civil Code. See YVES LEQUETTE, QUELQUES REMARQUES A PROPOS DU PROJET DE
CODE CIVIL EUROPEEN DE MONSIEUR VON BAR 2202-14 (2002); Bénédicte
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to the English method of transposition. Contrary to the problem based
U.K. approach on consumer protection, the French Code de la
Consommation was originally designed according to a political model, a
blueprint which was similar to the Civil Code in that it could guide the
development in Europe of a consistent body of consumer law rules.60
Contrary to most other Member States in the European Union,
the consumer movement in France bore a strong political dimension,
at least in the 1970s and 1980s, which largely derived from
politicization through integrating consumer policy into politics. Trade
unions in France were tied to various left wing parties, each of which
had to leave their footprint on the then new policy.61 It is only because
the European Union took over consumer policy in the second half of

Fauvarque-Cosson, Faut-il un code civil européen?, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
CIVIL 463 (2002); see also Christian Joerges, Der Europäisierungsprozess als Herausforderung
des Privatrechts: Plädoyer für eine neue Rechtsdisziplin, in EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT IM
WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN DISKURS 133, 142 (Andreas Furrer ed., 2006) (interpreting
the conflict between the German professorial model of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
(BGB) and the democratic tradition of the Code Civil); Wolfgang Wurmnest, Common
Core, Grundregeln, Kodifikationsentwürfe, Acquis-Grundsätze – Ansätze internationaler
Wissenschaftlergruppen zur Privatrechtsvereinheitlichung in Europa, 11 ZEUP 714 (2003);
Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Droit europen des contrats: première réaction au plan d’áction
de la Commission, RECUEIL DALLOZ 1171 (2003); Philippe Malinvaud, Réponse-hors
délai-à la Commission européenne: à propos d’un code européenne des contrats, in PENSEE
JURIDIQUE FRANCAISE ET HARMONISATION EUROPEENNE DU DROIT 231
(Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2003) ; JEAN HUET, NOUS
FAUT-IL UN ‘EURO’ DROIT CIVIL? 2611-14 (2002). Whether or not the French Civil
Code would pass the identity test under the Lisbon Treaty is another story. See HansW. Micklitz, German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht BVerfG) 2 BvE 2/08,
30.6.2009 – Organstreit Proceedings between Members of the German Parliament and the Federal
Government, 7 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 528 (2011).
60
JEAN CALAIS-AULOY, COMMISSION DE LA REFONTE, LE DROIT DE LA
CONSOMMATION EN FRANCE (1981).
61
This might explain why attempts to build connections between labor
law and consumer law were particulary strong in France, to some extent in Italy, and
only marginal in Germany. See MICHEL MIAILLE, UNE INTRODUCTION CRITIQUE
AU DROIT (1976); ENZO ROPPO, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ UND KLASSENTHEORIE
109 (1976); KLAUS TONNER, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ ALS GEWERKSCHAFTLICHE
AUFGABE 252 (1979); KLAUS TONNER, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ UND
KLAASSENTHEORIE – ERWIDERUNG AUF ENZO ROPPO 241 (1976).
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the 1980s after the Single European Act62 that consumer policy became
de-politicized in France.
C.

The German Model: Liberal and Authoritarian/Paternalistic

The German Civil Code is 100 years younger than the French
Civil Code. In 1815, the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna and the
scattered German regions that comprised various kingdoms and
counties (earldoms) failed to unite into a German state under a
common constitution. It took until 1871 before Germany managed,
under the regime of the Prussian king and his chancellor Bismarck, to
finally adopt a constitution. It took an additional thirty years before the
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), as it is called in German, was enacted.
My arguments are built upon two major guiding assumptions.
First, there is a direct line from Kant to Savigny to Weber and the
formal rationality of the private law system, which serves to constitute
the capitalist society. The Kantian philosophy inspired Savigny to
formulate the so-called Historische Schule (Historical School), which was
influential during the nineteenth century among private law theorists
and, remarkably, continues to be influential even after the fall of the
wall in 1989.63 Historische Schule has created a particular way of thinking,
favoring the transition from “The Social” to the “pure” private law
system. Social issues and regulations were outsourced by a technocratic
decision to specialize private law legislation outside the BGB, although
adopted 100 years later than the more integrative approach of the
French Code Civil.64 This time period gave the German BGB a
62
Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) (entered into
force July 1, 1987).
63
See Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative
Law, and the Emergence of a European Science, 112 L.Q. REV. 576 (1996); Horst
Eidenmüller et al., The Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law – Policy Choices
and Codification Problems, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659 (2008) (criticizing the
European private law codification project, which is inspired from and based on the
destruction of the common philosophical ground of private law in the civil and
common law systems).
64
Both the French Code Civil and the German BGB covered tenant law.
In France, tenant law has remained an integral part of the civil code, whereas German
tenant law has become a legal field in itself, outsourced in special acts and only
partially integrated in the BGB through the modernization of the law of obligations
(Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz) in 2002. For details on the development of
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particular ideological outlook, which maintained and defended an early
nineteenth century bourgeois model of society and economy against
the rising political and social transformations brought about by the
industrial age and the labor movement.65
Second, there is the link between Fichte, Hegel, Thibaut,
German idealism, and legal naturalism, as expressed in Jhering, von
Gierke, Ehrlich, Weber, and Kantorowicz wherein national ideals were
tied to the social ideals of a society and a nation.66 Such a vision can
hardly be connected to the authoritarian Prussian state, which
provided social protection to workers67 only as a means to compensate
workers for their exclusion from political participation (Sozialistengesetze
1978). The German version of legal naturalism favors an instrumental
use of social regulation, but carefully avoids and downplays the
political dimension inherent in “The Social.”68
The intellectual quarrel between two German law professors,
Thibaut and Savigny, over the value of a codified German Civil Code
is paradigmatic for tensions arising in the German legal system:
Thibaut fought enthusiastically in Heidelberg–inspired by German
Idealism and les grandes idées of the French revolution–for a genuine
German Code; Savigny fought brilliantly (but not enthusiastically) for
the maintenance of the old Roman law.69 Law-making in Germany in
the early nineteenth century was understood as an academic exercise,
quite contrary to the democratic discussion that surrounded the
tenant law in Europe, see Christoph U. Schmid & Jason R. Dinse, The European
Dimension of Residential Tenancy Law, 9 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 201 (2013).
65
There is a connection between the late industrialization relative to the
UK, the labor movement, and the Bismarckian reaction. See, e.g., HUGO SINZHEIMER,
EIN ARBEITSTARIFGESETZ: DIE IDEE DER SOZIALEN SELBSTBESTIMMUNG IM
RECHT (1916).
66
See WIEACKER, supra note 48. Most of the legal auxiliary sciences such
as criminology and legal sociology have their origin in legal naturalism and in the
Freirechtsschule (Free Law Movement).
67
E.g., 1883 health insurance, 1884 accident insurance.
68
See Hermann U. Kantorowicz who attacks Savigny’s influence on the
construction of the Civil Code and on what I call here “Rechtsbewußtsein”.
Hermann U. Kantorowicz, Was ist uns Savigny, 1 RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFT 47, 76
and seq. (1911).
69
ANTON FRIEDRICH JUSTUS THIBAUT & FRIEDRICH CARL VON
SAVIGNY, IHRE PROGRAMMATISCHEN SCHRIFTEN, MIT EINER EINFÜHRUNG VON
HANS HATTENHAUER (1973).
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adoption and distribution of the French Civil Code.70 The outcome
was a civil code that lacked the required “socialist oil.”71 This defect
was remedied in the twentieth century by judges through judge-made
law, and by the legislator through the adoption of numerous special
laws.
German legal culture has two main components: a liberal
dimension, which is shared by English law and enshrined in
commercial freedom to contract; and a political dimension, which is
shared by French law and enshrined in the much stronger commitment
to “The Social.”72 The English streak dates back to the merging of the
German Länder (states) under a tight Prussian grip, which triggered the
industrial revolution and led to an amazing boost for the economy. In
this context, the predominance of the market and a sense of English
pragmatism can be felt. The German state, however, is not a liberalenabling state in the Anglo-Saxon sense. The German state is rooted
in the authoritarian heritage of pre-democratic times. As such, the state
is seen as the key regulator to realize not only economic but also
political objectives, which brings German legal culture nearer to its
French counterpart. However, contrary to France where the political
also bears a strong top-down dimension, the political dimension in
Germany is more bottom-up as it is always connected to expectations
set by the citizens of the state. Today, the early Bismarkian regulatory
state and the post-World War II welfare state still bears elements of
authoritarian care-taking, which is different from England due to the
strong interventionist side and different from France due to the lack
of an open political discourse. The tension between the liberals and the
70
See Reinhard Zimmermann, Consumer Contract Law and General Contract
Law: The German Experience, 58 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 415 (2005); Harm Schepel,
Professorenrecht? The Field of European Private Law, in LAWYER’S CIRCLES – LAWYERS
AND EUROPEAN LEGAL INTEGRATION 115 (2004); Rainer Maria Kiesow,
Rechtswissenschaft – was ist das?, 12 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 585, 586 (2010).
71
OTTO VAN GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS 13
(1889); TILMAN REPGEN, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS: EINE
GRUNDFRAGE IN WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION AM ENDE DES 19.
JAHRHUNDERTS (2001).
72
GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS IM
ORGANISIERTEN KAPITALISMUS, BAND 1: VON DER GRÜDERZEIT ZUR WEIMARER
REPUBLIK (1977); GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS IM
ORGANISIERTEN KAPITALISMUS, BAND 2: VOM FASCHISMUS BIS ZUR GEGENWART
(1979).
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authoritarians explains why political debates in Germany so easily turn
into ideological conflicts, just as it was between Thibaut and Savigny.
What does this mean for the German variant of freedom of
contract—or private autonomy (Privatautonomie) as phrased in the
context of the intellectual history—and the limitation of freedom of
contract via statutory regulation? Private autonomy centers on the
individual. But who is the individual? The reasonable Cartesian French
person/citizen, the utilitarian Englishman, or the idealistic
Kantian/Hegelian subject? The key question in German legal theory—
although not in commercial transactions, freedom of contract, the
common law of contracts, or the droit des obligations—is how this
individual can bind himself legally. The conceptual difference is visible
in the comparison between the common law and the German Civil
Code. Only the German BGB contains a General Part (Allgemeiner Teil),
which not only precedes the law of contract, but also precedes family
law and the law of succession. The General Part holds the entire
German private law system, as laid down in the BGB, together. Its
content triggers irritation and uncertainty outside Germany (what is a
juridical act? Ein Rechtsgeschäft?73). The key to understanding the
idealistic German concept of private autonomy is to appreciate its
roots in the so-called “will theory” (Willenstheorie), which states that the
individual is bound through his will, rather than through his
declaration (Erklärung).74 It is true that the Prussian legislator
introduced corrections to the “will theory” into the BGB, which have
been amplified by the judiciary in the twentieth century. Idealistic
thinking embedded in the concept of private autonomy is still alive: it
has been taken up by the Freiburg school, ordo-liberalism, and the
private law society.75 Its counterpart, the resistance against restrictions,
more often than not bears a strong ideological bias that is outweighed

73
The Academic Draft Common Frame of Reference contains such a
general part in compliance with the German BGB.
74
The “will theory” is extremely helpful because it combines European
legal thought with American legal thought. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory
to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 94 (2000).
75
See ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMÄCKER, A LEGAL THEORY WITHOUT LAW:
POSNER V. HAYEK ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 174 (2007) (responding to the
critics of law and economics against ordo-liberalism).
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by intense legislative activities in the twentieth century for the benefit
of those contracting parties with weaker bargaining power.
Again, I will use Directive 99/44/EC as a blueprint to explain
the continuity of the German Rechtsbewusstsein and the tension between
the liberal and authoritarian views of freedom of contract. In the
shadow of the so-called modernization of German contract law
(Schuldrechts-Modernisierungsgesetz) in 2002, the executive, i.e., the
Ministry of Justice, used the expiry of the two-year implementation
period to complete the twenty-year long pending project of revising
the German Civil Code, thereby “smuggling” the bulk of consumer
contract law rules into the German Civil Code. This integration of Civil
Code and consumer contract law perhaps was not an authoritarian, but
a paternalistic move.76 The academic debates focused almost entirely
on the proposed revision of the prescription rules, in particular, on
Leistungsstörungsrecht (law on the interference with or impairment of the
performance of an obligation). This revision has been performed as a
technical bureaucratic exercise.77 Pragmatism might have guided
German scholars to accept the development of a new sales law, as a
common pattern for business to business (B2B) and B2C relations;
however, contrary to France and the Netherlands, there was no deeper
political discussion, especially on the possible role of consumer law as
an integral part of the civil code, in the open democratic fora in
Germany. Until today, consumer law has remained a foreign body in
76
There is a deeper discussion needed on the difference between
(Prussian) authoritarianism and (post-Second World War) German paternalism. See
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. VI (1835), for a starting
point on this distinction (“[a]bove this race of men stands an immense and tutelary
power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over
their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be
like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for
manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is
well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but
rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to
be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their security,
foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their
principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and
subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking
and all the trouble of living?”).
77
See, e.g., Stephan Lorenz, Fünf Jahre “neues” Schuldrecht im Spiegel der
Rechtsprechung, 1-2 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1 (2007).
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the German BGB. The integration of “The Social” has not led to an
overall re-thinking of the foundations of the German BGB. Instead,
the two parts, although located in the same civil code, are each rooted
in their very particular intellectual history.78
D.

The European Model: Enabling and Restricting

Over the last sixty years, the European legal order and the
European constitutional charter79 have yielded a genuine model of
freedom of contract to protect participants in an ever-growing Internal
Market. At the same time, however, the European legal order and
constitutional charter have also set boundaries to this established
freedom of contract.80 How is it possible that the European Union is
able to generate a distinct model, different from national ones? I am
not so much interested in whether the emerging European model
should be understood as some kind of reaction to the globalization of
markets.81 My focus is on the intellectual history of the European legal
order that underpins Europe and the European Union. Although
Europe and the European Union are intertwined, they must be kept
separate in our discussion.
Perspective matters. Europe is treated as a homogenous whole
by those on the outside, and particularly by U.S. legal scholars. Two
examples of such over-generalized discussions about Europe include
the work of James Whitman on U.S. consumerism versus E.U.
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UNTERNEHMEN EINE NEUE ARCHITEKTUR DES VERBRAUCHERRECHTS? GUTACHTEN A ZUM 69. JURISTENTAG 129 (2012); Hans-W. Micklitz, Do Consumers and
Business Need a New Architecture for Consumer Law? A Thought Provoking Impulse, 32 Y.B.
EUROPEAN L. 266 (2012).
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Market Freedoms and Fundamental Rights in the Case Law of the CJEU, in GENERAL
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Groussot & Felix Schulyok eds., 2013); NORBERT REICH, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
EU CIVIL LAW (2013).
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producerism,82 and the work of Daniel Kelemen on Eurolegalism.83 In
general, scholars tend to treat the south and north, the east and west,
and the European Union and European Council the same. Similarly,
there is little discussion in contemporary research on where Europe
ends: European countries are considered a single entity, this entity is
often implicitly equated with the European Union, and then the entity
is compared with the United States.84
Does the conception of freedom of contract and its statutory
limitation reflect a common denominator of English Utilitarianism,
French Rationalism, and German Idealism? Is there a foundation
shared by the English liberal and pragmatic, French rational and
political, and German liberal and authoritarian? To what extent does
this intellectual crossover mutually impact England, France, and
Germany? Those who stress a common cultural foundation insist on
an intellectual exchange between the great minds behind the concepts
of empiricism, utilitarianism, rationalism, enlightenment, and idealism.
For centuries, European intellectuals shared a common language,
Latin, which gradually vanished between the seventeenth and
nineteenth centuries. The deeper cultural foundation, however, cannot
be based in language alone. For example, in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, leading private lawyers from all over Europe
and the United States were involved in intellectual exchange, but all
wrote in their respective languages.85 It seems as if the intellectual
James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in
Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340, 407 (2007).
83
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EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 39, at 3-68;
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POLITY, supra note 39. This kind of thinking might be due to the historical
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of Europe.
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exchange was much more intense hundreds of years ago than it is
today, since today the English language dominates the intellectual
discourse and non-English contributions to the intellectual history of
Europe are no longer perceived.
Wieacker is perhaps one of the few scholars who looks behind
the three main intellectual historical strains and condenses the
common European legal culture that unites the private law in der
Neuzeit86 (in modern times) into three invariables. The first invariable
is personalism, which is directly connected to the role of the individual,
autonomy, and freedom in private law. The second invariable is
legalism in which decisions are bound to the rule of law. The third
invariable is European intellectualism, which drives European legal
thinking in the direction of thematization, conceptualization, and
contradiction-free consistency of the law.
Is Wieacker’s theory correct? Is the revitalization of the
common European legal culture after the Second World War not
guided by the political purpose it had to fulfill? Can the common
European legal culture be regarded as an attempt to rewrite legal
history? I fear that these questions are too broad for this paper.87 The
debate on the possible legal philosophical foundations of Europe88 and
European private law89 is just about to start. The handbook edited by
Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis90 on the philosophical
foundations of E.U. law mainly focuses on European constitutional
86
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87
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http://www.polsoz.fuberlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/index.html.
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theory, rather than European private law and European private law
theory.91
To understand the European model of freedom of contract, it
is helpful to look at the intellectual history, and perhaps the
constitutional history, of the European Union. This understanding
requires a leap to the post-war period, when the European Economic
Community was launched and the European Union was created.
Scholars92 advocated for the revitalization and re-invigoration of a
common European culture to enable a peaceful and prosperous future
for the European peoples. For example, scholars advocated for peace
through economic integration, and in 1986, the Single European Act
added social integration to the new European legal order.93
Economic integration of the European Union is based on the
free movement rights and competition. In particular, German
academics in the ordo-liberal tradition have argued that private
autonomy is enshrined into the free movement rights.94 Economic
integration aims at enabling the growth of, or paving the way for,
private entrepreneurship in the ever-bigger common European
market. The abundant case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
on the four freedoms often involves contractual disputes in which one
party seeks access to the market but is barred by national statutory

91
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94
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a nice account of the European economic constitution and its influence on
(European) private law, see Sabine Frerichs & Teemu Juutilainen, Rome under Seven
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regulation.95 Private autonomy then obtains a different meaning,
namely, it is bound to trans-border business and European economic
integration. The European variant is functional and instrumental.
Social regulation in European private law is very much focused
on consumer protection.96 The tone of such social regulation is set by
the famous Sutherland Report.97 Consumers and consumer protection
rules are needed to complete the Internal Market (the 1986 program
behind the Single European Act). Putting it differently, the price to pay
for the Completion of the Internal Market is the adoption of minimum
social (protection) standards.98 The overall philosophy is enshrined in
the wording of Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
Europe Union (TFEU), formerly Article 95 EC and Article 100a
respectively, which adopted measures to complete the Internal Market
in realizing social protection standards.99 In the late 1970s and early
1980s, several consumer and labor protection rules were adopted
under the unanimity principle, the enabling of autonomy and the
limitation of autonomy go hand-in-hand. The broadening of economic
freedoms, similar to common law freedom of contract, preceded the
development of protective standards that limited freedom of contract,
mainly through binding legal standards.
This development is by no means limited to the field of
traditional private law, contract law and consumer protection, or
employment contracts and labor protection. European private law is
95
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(Dorota Leczykiewicz & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2013).
96
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(2004).
98
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regulatory by nature, as the European Union is and will be under
constant construction. Legal rules remain a key instrument for
regulation. The most prominent field of action beyond traditional
private law and even traditional fields of social regulation (e.g.,
consumer and labor protection) has been the so-called regulated
markets. The liberalization and privatization policy implemented by
the Single European Act in telecom, energy, postal services, transport,
and financial services, the dismantling of former state monopolies,
amounts to a political decision to establish markets where there were
none.100 This policy enabled freedom of contract with statutory
limitations. Therefore, enabling and restricting are the two parameters
that characterize the European model of freedom of contract.
E.

Stand and Stare

Provided my analysis contains an element of truth–and I hope
it does–what is the added value of this finding for our understanding
of freedom of contract and even more so for the communication
between lawyers across legal cultures and traditions, just like those
lawyers in our Academy for International Commercial and Consumer
Law? First and foremost, the value added is to “Stand and Stare,”101
and to distance ourselves from our subjects of analysis and own
cultural roots and traditions.
“Stand and Stare,” however, is just the first step. I do not want
to argue that our legal cultures and traditions are set in stone and that
there is no room for mutual learning and for change. Indeed, there is
arguably an emerging European legal culture, certainly in key areas of
See Hans-W. Micklitz, The Visible Hand of European Private Law, 28
YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 3 (2009); in Italian, La mano visibile del diritto privato
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NAZIONALE FORENSE: COLLANA “STUDI STORICI E GIURIDICI” 125-92 (Guido
Alpa & Roberta Mazzei, eds. 2010); in Finnish, Lakimies 3/2010, 330-56; in Japanese,
Yōroppa kisei watashi-hō no mokuteki-teki shuhō: Yōroppa watashi-hō no, kyōsō to kisei ni okeru
jiritsu kara kinō shugi e no hen’yō, 12 HOKKAIDO JOURNAL OF NEW GLOBAL LAW AND
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private law102–some would argue this legal culture has been enshrined
in Europe since the ius commune. There is also an emerging culture of
transnational law,103 which is now gaining ever stronger attention with
a refocused understanding and design of comparative and
transnational (legal) history.104 I fear, however, that we are approaching
a divided legal world—a world where each state contains a national
legal order in which the territory and language are transnational. There
is a chance for deepening our understanding of the “many faces of
freedom of contract,” for learning from each other and for developing
even a common cultural ground.105
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